Abstract
Introduction
To succeed in e-commerce marketplace, Security protocols have played an important role in authenticating secure messages and achieving security. Recently, formal methods have been prevalent to aid the design and analysis of the security protocols [1, 2] . In [3] , they are either used to evaluate the trust that can be put on the goal by the legitimate communicants using the beliefs of the principals [2] , or analyze the security of a protocol by examining the knowledge gained by an intruder in the course of the protocols. In general, they ideally assume that the communication channel and principals are secure and trustworthy.
However, in a hostile environment, the beliefs of principals and transmitted messages can no longer be justified. Then, it is necessary to have the capability of modelling the imperfect working conditions and verifying protocol under such circumstances. In recent years, the uncertainty and partial belief have attracted much attentions [3] . Fagin and Halpern [4] introduced a new probabilistic method to deal with uncertainty. Campbell [3] presented an extension of BAN logic to reason about a secure protocol by qualifying the beliefs of principals with probability. Moreover, many formalisms have been put forward in the artificial intelligence and database literature to merge the inconsistent knowledge. In [5] , Liberatore gave a merging process arbitration to merge the different views between different sources of information; Lin defined a merging operator by majority in contrast with arbitration to merge knowledge base in [6] . All these methods are useful in dealing with the inconsistent beliefs.
Unlike the general knowledge, the belief of secure messages has some properties, such as the freshness and dynamics. We have to guarantee the beliefs are not expired before starting validation. Besides, the inferred belief of every message source is actually obtained by combing the assumed belief, observed belief and probability of belief of rules together. This paper proposes a formal framework to merge inconsistent beliefs in secure messages by a majority criterion. It minimizes the global dissatisfaction rather than individual dissatisfaction. Moreover, the freshness and dynamics properties of secure messages are considered when integrating their beliefs, which aim at ensuring the correctness of verification of security protocols.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present some technical preliminaries. Section 3 describes how to merge the inconsistent belief. Some examples are presented in Section 4. Section 5 concludes this paper.
Preliminaries

Semantic
Suppose L denotes a set of proposition formulae formed in the usual way from a set of atom symbols A. In particular, A can contain α and ¬α for some atom α. The logical operators ∧, ∨, ¬ and → denotes the connectives. We use variables X, Y, P and CA for principals, Greek letters α, γ, θ, µ, β, ϕ, φ and ψ ∈ A for formulae, m for messages, T expiration for expiration date of message, T for timestamp. Let ∃ be existential quantifier. Let ≡ be logical equivalence. A model of a formula φ is a possible set of atoms where φ is true in the usual sense; is the weight of message sources; Let k be a key.
• <-, -> :: Message 1 × Message 2 ⇒ Message, which denotes a set of messages.
• -sends -, -:: Principal 1 × Principal 2 × Message ⇒ Formula, which denotes the message was transmitted from Principal 1 to Principal 2 .
• knows :: Principal × Message ⇒ Formula, which denotes the message has been generated.
• sees :: Principal × Message ⇒ Formula, which denotes the message has been received.
• fresh :: Message ⇒ Formula, which denotes the message has not been uttered.
• -believes -, -::
Formula, which denotes Principal 1 believes the messages are fresh and were sent from Principal 2 .
• -authenticates -, -:: In general, facts are stated in the form of expressions called sentences. We define an atomic sentence is formed from an n-ary relation operator mentioned above and n atom symbols a 1 , a 2 , . . ., a n , by combining them as follows.
and "fresh(m)" are three atomic sentences.
The entailment relationship among the above operators is listed below. In ENDL logic [7] , sends, knows, sees and fresh are primitive operators. We can turn these operators into the following axiom.
where the principal P generates m and then sends it to Q. If Q receives this message and confirms it is fresh, it is reasonable for Q to believe m sent from P. However, it does not imply Q believes the integrity and confidentiality of m. The validation processes are listed below. The knows, sends and sees operators present the dynamics properties of secure messages.
Moreover, the implication α ⇒ β actually denotes a rule. The following rules are derived from the authentication axioms of ENDL.
where ID is identity; H(m) is the hashing of message m; Spv() and Spb() present private and public signature key respectively; and S(m, k) describes m is encrypted by k.
Usually, the believes operator should be appropriate for describing belief. However, the belief in secure messages is more complicated. It not only depends on the assumed belief and observed belief, but also on the belief of inference rules. We will give the details in next section. Definition 2.1 Let T be a timestamp attached to message m. If |Clock−T| < ∆t 1 + ∆t 2 regarding received messages or T < T expiration regarding generated messages then m is fresh; otherwise m is viewed as a replay.
where Clock is the local time, t 1 is an interval representing the normal discrepancy between the server's clock and the local clock, and t 2 is an interval representing the expected network delay time [8] . The timestamp plays an important role in preventing the replays of previously transmitted secure messages. 
where the receiver and the third party can receive messages from different senders. In particular, "α is fresh" in these formulae is decided by using T < T expiration . Also, the M R and M T must check the freshness of α by using |Clock−T| < ∆t 1 + ∆t 2 when they receive messages from the senders. These will assist them in determining whether they believe the message α or not.
The supporting relation considers the dynamics property of secure message by using the knows and sees operators that describe the dynamic transmission of secure messages. Furthermore, the freshness of secure message is protected by relying on the discriminant of timestamp.
Definition 2.3
Let |= match be a matching relationship. M |= match is defined as follows, where Rule = {rule 1 , rule 2 , rule 3 } is a set of axioms used to authenticate messages, and S M is a subset of message source M.
where the principal searches the associated message source M. If there is a subset derived from the message source M that matches one of the three inference rules, we can decide it is true; otherwise it is false. The message source M S is the initiator of messages. Therefore we just verify the message m in terms of the supporting relation but do not intend to match the inference rules.
Definition 2.4
Let |= authenticate be a belief relationship. M |= authenticate m is defined as follows, where m is a message needed to be verified.
where the supporting relation is the starting point. If one of the rules is satisfied we can say the message m is reliable; otherwise it is unreliable.
The |= support , |= match and |= authenticate actually describe the transformation of belief during the authentication process of messages.
As mentioned above, the rule presents an entailment relationship among messages. In particular, the conditions of a rule can be the conclusion of other rule, called relevant rule.
Definition 2.5 Suppose
. ., α n−1 → α n be entailment relationships among them. Then we can deduce a new rule below if they are true.
These entailment relationships virtually denote the operations of encryption, decryption, signature and authentication in cryptography.
Example 2.4 1) If
Alice knows a symmetric key k and message m then she knows e(m, k) that presents the message m was encrypted by k; and 2) if Alice knows message m encrypted by k, then she can send encrypted m to Tom. A new rule can then be derived from them, If Alice knows k and m, then she can send the encrypted m to Tom for the reason that the result of the first message is actually the condition of the second message. As a result, Alice is able to send e(m, k) to Tom. Definition 2. 6 Suppose β 1 , . . ., β n (n ≥ 1) are secure messages. M ∈ {M S , M R , M T }. Let β 1 ∧, . . ., ∧ β n be a conjunction, which is a set of secure messages connected by the ∧ operator.
where if the message source M supports every message β i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, then M should support the conjunction of these messages and vice versa.
Besides, a supporting relation should satisfy these constraints. Let δ be a conjunction of atoms, and α and β be atoms in the usual sense. The implication, transitivity and negation are listed below.
1) Implication constraint:
Consider the sensitivity of secure messages, it is hence impractical for a secure message source to support the disjunction messages with 'or' relationship, such as M |= support α ∨ β.
Formal logic, Probability and Belief
A formal logic used to verify security protocols consists of a set of sentences S and inference rules R. For example, "knows (Alice, k) and sends(Alice, Bob, m) are sentences. The sentences are formed in terms of the syntax of the logic. It generates meaningful statements according to its semantics. An inference rule indicates the relationship between sentences. We will use a 1 , a 2 , . . ., a n ⇒ c for the rule which combines the sentence c with sentences a 1 , a 2 , . . ., a n . Among them, c is said to be the conclusion inferred from the sentences a 1 , a 2 , . . ., a n .
A sentence φ can be true or false. We can imagine two set of possible worlds W 1 and W 2 . W 1 contains worlds in which φ was true and W 2 contains worlds where φ is false. The actual world, however, must be in one of these two sets, but we might not know which one. We can model the uncertainty by probability.
Define the probability space (W, F, P) for B = S ∪ R, such that for each w ∈ W, we can assign a truth assignment to c by defining w(c) = 1 if there is a proof of c from B.
The probability P describes the degree of belief of the conclusions. The probability of a conclusion c can be defined as the probability that the proof of c from B is valid.
Let M = {M 1 , . . ., M n } be a sequence of message sources. It is natural that the sentences are assigned different belief by them. In general, the belief of m depends on the assumed belief (weight), inferred belief and the probability of belief of rules. According to the definition of probability of independent events, the belief in a conclusion c inferred from M i can be defined as follows:
Merging Inconsistent Beliefs in Secure Messages
Belief in Secure Messages
Belief is referred as principals view of secure messages, which can be introduced directly or inferred through perception, assumption or communication among principals.
Among them, the observed and assumed belief are selfsupported belief. The former is the practical belief observed by the message source, and the latter presents the assumed weight attached with each message source. In addition, we have to include the probability of belief of rules.
The weight of a message source is an assumed belief and recommended by authorities. Its value may vary between 0 and 1. MS , MR and MT represent the weights of sender, receiver and the third party respectively. For example, MS = 0.5 means the possibility of the sender's belief is 50% only.
Unlike the weight, the practical belief is derived from the observation by checking the inconsistency of secure messages. Then, the reliability between α and a set of message sources is defined below. where the denotes a union operation but the repeated items are reserved, such as {α, ¬β} {α} = {α, α, ¬β}. Moreover, α and β have to be fresh in each source of secure messages in terms of the above definitions. In particular, if |M S M R M T |= support α| = 0 then reliability(α) = 0, which presents the set of sources of secure messages does not support α.
The reliability is the observed belief, which is shared among the message sources. Except that, the weights of message sources and the probability of belief of rules need to be included to measure the final belief of authenticated goal.
Merging Inconsistent Belief
The inconsistent belief happens frequently in hostile environment. In the verification of security protocols, one of the most important steps is to check the authenticity of secure messages.
In our formal framework, the ultimate goal is to derive the reliability of statement "X authenticates Y, m", in which m can be encryption key, digital signature etc. In Definition 4, we have described the satisfiable conditions regarding the authentication of secure messages. The belief of a statement m can be defined as follows.
where the probability of belief of M S can be derived from the assigned weight and calculated reliability on message. However, the probabilities of belief of M R and M T have to depend on the probability of the matched rules except their weights and reliability on messages.
The message source should not only maintain individual beliefs but also is responsible for keeping a common belief shared among them. The uncertain belief is not allowed here under the consideration of security. Therefore, the final updated beliefs shared among M S , M R and M T are:
is the number of message sources that believes m, and Sum(M, Dis) is the number of them that disbelieves m. Finally, we can conclude the following formulaes.
• If Sum(M, Bel) > Sum(M, Dis), then the authenticator decides to believe in the statement m;
• otherwise, the authenticator disbelieves m.
Thereby, the problem of inconsistent belief is solved using the majority criterion.
Examples of Merging Inconsistent Belief
Let S be the sender, R be the receiver, T be the third party and A be the authenticator in the following examples. For brevity, it assumes that all the messages transmitted among the secure message sources are fresh. Also, the messages are assumed to be generated and sent by the sender and received and seen by whom it claims to be. In the message set of M S , α ∧ β ∧ θ is supported by M S for M S supports α, β and θ. The result gives the common belief in α shared among the messgae sources M S , M R and M T .
Finally, the inferred belief can be derived from the assumed belief, observed belief and the probability of belief of the rule. 
Conclusion
This paper has proposed a probabilistic method to evaluate the inconsistent beliefs in secure messages. It makes us able to compute their individual beliefs in secure messages, and resolve the conflict among them by majority criterion. The examples have proved that our method is useful in integrating inconsistent belief in the analysis of security protocols.
